1 The Importance of
Guaranteeing Access to Justice
Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country
who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment.
The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in sometime later on. “It is
possible”, says the gatekeeper, “but not now”. […] The man from the country has not
expected such difficulties: the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks, but as he now looks
more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large pointed nose and his long, thin […] he
decides that it would be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside. The gatekeeper gives him a
stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There he sits for days and years.
Franz Kafka, Before the Law,
1925
- No one doubts that in the almost one hundred years that have passed
since Kafka wrote this parable, justice has experienced considerable progress. Nevertheless,
unfortunately, it is also true that today, in many parts of the planet, there are not a few who
experience their way through the courts similarly to the Kafkaesque peasant.
- How are citizens of the twenty-first century
positioned before the administration of justice? Legal problems are not odd to them; on the contrary,
such problems are on the rise. The average citizen is going to suffer throughout their life at least one
problem with legal implications. For example, according to the data from the World Justice Project,
around seven out of ten citizens from most Western countries (7 in Spain; 6.8 in Germany; 7.5 in
Austria; and 6.6 in the USA) experienced a conflict with legal implications in the last two years
(2022/2023).[1] More than a third of these problems remain unresolved.[2] Either because
citizens are unaware of the law or do not recognize the legal dimension of their problems, because they
lack resources to litigate, or because they do not know how to access appropriate conflict resolution
mechanisms. Two additional issues must be taken into consideration. Firstly, such problems are not
experienced in the same way by all: people who are more vulnerable to socio-economic exclusion typically
report more legal problems than other groups. Secondly, such conflicts affect them more because they are
normally combined with other difficulties (social, professional, economic), so that the failure to
resolve legal problems can contribute to a cycle of decline in which one problem leads to another with
escalating individual and social costs and reinforces poverty and socio-economic exclusion.[3] That is why the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), from their legal needs surveys, concludes
that ‘the inability to access legal and justice services can be both a result and a cause of
poverty’.[4]
- Furthermore, the data shows that the lack of effective resolution
of conflicts does not exhaust its negative effects in the personal sphere of the affected citizens. It
is, in fact, not only a problem concerning the violation of an individual fundamental right. It is also
a public issue with high social impact and huge economic costs (in business, in lost productivity in the
workplace, but even in the increase of mental health costs), hindering the growth of communities and
societies, with a direct impact on their GDP, so it is a clear enhancer of poverty in the countries. For
example, the estimation in Great Britain is that unresolved disputes and serious
legal problems may cost the economy up to GBP 3.5 billion annually (GBP 1.5 billion in costs to public
services and GBP 2 billion in lost income through loss of employment)’.[5] For this reason,
in addition to the efforts made by individual states or at a supranational level, there is a strong
global movement to fill this access gap and, in this context, the United Nations has set itself as an
Objective of its 2030 Agenda ‘equal access to justice for all’ (Goal 16.3).[6]
2 Current Status of Access to Justice
2.1 Introduction
- Given the importance of access to justice, whatever its nature,
definition, and legal recognition, which we will explore in detail in the next chapter, it is crucial to
ensure that this right is not merely nominal but actual. All efforts made to improve the administration
of justice are of little use if, in practice, citizens have difficulty opening the door, if entry is
facilitated, but only in theory, as the Irish judge Sir James Matthew vividly described in the
nineteenth century: ‘In England, Justice is open to all - like the Ritz Hotel’.[7]
- Although many of the fundamental aspects of the right to a court
have been redefined in recent years, as we will analyse in the next Chapter, its substance remains
unchanged. The right of access to a court means the power granted to applicants to seek remedy before a
court of law. This right must be effective and be protected by all legal safeguards. This, as described
by Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, involves both the de facto and de jure access to the courts;
in other words, not only must the legal system respect and uphold it, but measures must also be taken to
ensure that this fundamental right is not impaired in any way.[8] Moreover, according to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), this right extends beyond the initial action of requesting
remedy before a court. Going deeper, the ECtHR has stated repeatedly that ‘the right to a court
includes not only the right to institute proceedings but also the right to obtain a determination of the
dispute by a court’, based on the premise that if member states were not able to guarantee the
power of their courts to settle disputes by issuing a final decision, the right to a court would be
‘illusory’.[9] It is irrefutable in both legal doctrine and
practice that the right to access to justice is not absolute and may be subject to restraints imposed
differently depending on the historical and legal context in which it operates.[10] Thus, while
all applicants have the right to apply to the courts for redress, it does not follow that such an
application must always lead to court proceedings and final judgments. As affirmed by the ECtHR
‘the right of access to a court is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these are
permitted by implication since the right of access, by its very nature, calls for regulation by the
State, which enjoys a certain margin of appreciation in this regard’.[11] Therefore,
each legal system can have a particular regime of limitation periods[12], fully compatible with the right to
access, or can provide certain legal conditions or prerequisites (economic, procedural, subjective, etc)
for the submission of the claims to the courts. But these state powers have to be exercised with
caution: if not, applying overly severe restrictions, can, in the words of the European Court of
Justice, ‘undermine the essence of this right and effectively vacate it’[13]; in the same line,
the ECtHR explained that
such limitations will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if they do not
pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase cited above, § 195, with
further references; see also Grzęda, cited above,
§ 343, with further references).[14]
- Therefore, as shown by Cappelletti[15], the first step in determining the effectiveness of
the right to a court is to identify the barriers to be overcome in order to analyse whether these are
appropriate and proportional to the aim sought. Below, we will attempt to identify the most significant
barriers to accessing justice.
2.2 Current Barriers
to Access to Justice
- What makes justice less accessible in the twenty-first century?
Without claiming to be exhaustive, based on our global research on this issue, we consider that the most
significant barriers to accessing justice today are as follows:
- Lack of information about legal issues.
- Lack of understanding and accessibility to the justice
system.
- Inequalities in access to justice, that are particularly
detrimental to the most vulnerable parties.
- Procedural barriers.
- Growing litigation and overloaded courts.
- Financial limitations.
- In this chapter we will briefly outline these essential
difficulties in access to justice, trying in the next chapter to point out the current trends that seek
to mitigate them.
2.2.1 Lack of Legal
Information
- As affirmed recently by the European Commission for
the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ), ‘getting correct and sufficient information is essential to
guarantee an effective access to justice’.[16] In this regard, two aspects are of particular
concern:
- Firstly, lack of general information on legal issues. Citizens
often do not even know whether an issue has legal relevance or not. They often ignore necessary
information about the way to begin the judicial path (eg, about ‘the work and competences of
courts, the nature of the judicial proceedings, roles of the different professionals involved in the
procedures, legal representation, possibilities of legal aid, rights and obligations of individuals,
information on how to start a procedure, on timeframes of judicial proceedings, expected costs and
duration, relevant legislation, case-law, etc.’[17]) or the steps that have to be taken during its
development (about the phases of which the procedure consists, the hearings planned, the deadlines
envisaged, etc). In this sense, the lack of information concerning the legal channels to be followed to
apply for protection from the court and the procedural requirements to be met to both initiate and
conduct proceedings clearly constitutes a major barrier to applicants seeking to exercise their right to
a court. The European Court of Human Rights has often been called upon to rule in this regard and has
made its position abundantly clear. Member States must provide applicants with ‘a clear, practical
opportunity to challenge an act that is an interference with his rights’.[18]
- Although information may have been lacking even
before initiating proceedings, the biggest concerns refer to defects in communicating court decrees to
the parties during the proceedings. This concern has been repeatedly expressed by the European Courts.
For example, the ECtHR has pointed out that, although no specific notification system is provided in Art
6 ECHR[19],
it is its task to determine, in each case, whether a failure in communication or information regarding
the judicial channels to be followed by the parties has occurred in order to prevent a violation of
their right to a court. Such right would be ‘illusory if [the parties] were to be kept in the dark
about the developments in the proceedings and the court’s decisions on the claim, especially when
such decisions are of the nature to bar further examination’.[20] It is common knowledge that the
right to a fair trial, together with the prevalence of the principle of contradiction ‘requires
that the parties to a criminal or civil trial have the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on
all evidence adduced or observations filed by the opposing party with a view to influencing the
court’s decision’.[21] Therefore, failure to make court documents
available to the parties prevents them from effectively defending their claim. In this regard, the
European Court recognized that ‘the right of access included the right to receive appropriate
notification of judicial decision, particularly when the possibility of challenging the decision rests
on receiving such information’.[22] In the same line, the European Court of Justice
has affirmed that the lack of appropriate notification constitutes a violation of the right of effective
protection and, therefore, of the access to justice.[23]
- Secondly, lack of relevant data regarding the matter at issue,
especially when one of the parties has little information to be able to raise the dispute. To mitigate
these cases of information asymmetry we will study
how different mechanisms to facilitate access to sources of evidence have been making their way in
different legal systems.
2.2.2 Lack of
Understanding and Accessibility to the Justice System
- Citizens perceive the judiciary as a space that is alien and
cryptic to them. We will now analyse three key factors to determine the extent to which they contribute
to this general perception of the remoteness of justice: the language used in court, the design of the
courts and their organization.
2.2.2.1 Legal
Language
- There is no doubt that one of the most difficult barriers for
laymen to overcome is the understanding of legal language, in particular for certain groups, such as
minors or disabled. It is not, however, a question of adopting a basic and simple language, nor
eradicating legal language, under the umbrella of a sort of movement similar to that which, in 1793, in
the midst of the French Revolution, led to the suppression of the Schools of Law. Technicalities and
legal language should be used and, in fact, are essential in many contexts, but it is necessary to
ensure that the texts are more understandable to the public. An example of minimum standards in this
regard is found in the European Judges' Advisory Council on the Quality of Judicial Decisions
(2008):
any judicial decision must be intelligible, written in clear and simple language, an
essential condition for it to be understood by the parties and by the public. This requires a coherent
structure of the decision and the articulation of the argumentation in a clear style accessible to
all.[24]
- We will approach this issue in detail in the following Chapter.
2.2.2.2 Design of
Courts
- The design of judicial spaces is not neutral to citizens since it
conditions the way they face the courts and, therefore, it could help or hinder their access to justice
in reality. In turn, the way in which judicial spaces are designed is also a reflection of the values
that Justice wants to transmit to the users of justice at each moment and in each place. This has been
happening since time immemorial. Let us think about the importance of the great Roman basilicas in the
heart of their forums. More recently, when the extension of the Bordeaux courthouse was designed in
1992, Richard Rogers, its architect, wanted to convey to the public a positive perception of the
accessibility of the French judicial system and, therefore, decided to cover the building with glass to
symbolize the transparency and openness of justice.
- As we will analyse in detail in the following Chapter, these
considerations are not only relevant for the design of face-to-face court proceedings, but also for the
growing field of online court proceedings, which has gained more and more ground after the COVID-19
pandemic.
2.2.2.3 Organization of
Courts
- Citizens are also not indifferent to the organization of the
courts. As can be seen from the latest CEPEJ report about the countries comprised in the Council of
Europe, there has been a general trend in recent years towards specialization of the courts of first
instance and a general reduction in the number of general courts of this type.[25] Although this
change is generally justified in view of the growing complexity of law and litigation, it is no less
true that it may often lead to the disappearance of many courts that are closer to citizens, making it
more difficult for them to have effective access to justice. Or, even a little further on, some of these
reforms are really due to economic reasons to reduce court and staff costs or to try to make justice
more effective, without paying enough attention to the
citizens’ needs.
2.2.3 Inequalities in
Access to Justice, Particularly Detrimental to the Most Vulnerable Parties
- As indicated at the beginning of this Chapter, unfortunately, the path to
access to justice is still difficult for certain social groups that can be identified as
vulnerable. As we will see in the following Chapter, depending on the
nature of the conflict or where it has occurred, we may find different categories of vulnerable parties.
Traditionally, the poor, the indigenous, the elderly, the illiterate, the disabled or those
discriminated against based on religion, gender, race, or origin have made this category. In recent
years, new social groups must be considered, such as consumers or, even, in some cases, SMEs and the
middle class.
2.2.4 Procedural
Barriers
- To regulate the conditions for access to the court, legislators
design legal procedures according to different parameters (diverse national legal traditions,
principles, judicial organization, etc). The design is not, however, irrelevant to citizens,
particularly if it results in barriers or limitations that prevent them from being able to bring their
legal issues to court, thus impeding their effective access to justice. Let us think, for example, of
the setting of very short deadlines for carrying out procedural actions, or the imposition of excessive
conditions for the admission of the claim or for the filing of appeals, etc. In this context,
supranational courts and institutions have required proportionality in the configuration of procedural
formalities by each Member State (for example, in not few cases by the ECtHR).[26] In recent years, at least in the European Union, the
consideration of procedural rules as a possible obstacle to access to justice has taken a step further.
For example, in certain areas of qualified protection, some procedural rules – that do not
constitute per se barriers to access to justice – are deemed as restrictive of a comprehensive
protection to certain groups of society (as it is the case of consumers). We will elaborate on this
issue in the next Chapter.
2.2.5 Growing Complex
Litigation and Overloaded Courts
- Class actions, mass litigation, competition law macro-proceedings,
bankruptcy proceedings. These are just some of the examples of cases that have flooded the courts in the
last decades, both at the national and cross-border level (especially in the first instance[27]). As has been
remarked by the Council of Europe, as we are in a time of ‘the constant adoption of new
legislation, whether at the international, European or domestic level, and changing case-law and
doctrine are making legal science increasingly vast and complex’, making it ‘difficult for
the judge to master all these fields, while at the same time society and litigants demand more and more
professionalism and efficiency from the courts’.[28] In this context, measures as specialization of
the courts have to be taken to tackle this new panorama.[29] The implementation of
information and communication technology (ICT) is also being used as an escape route to face with such
challenges.
2.2.6 Financial
Limitations
- One of the most common barriers faced by applicants seeking redress
in court is the high cost of bringing legal actions. Legal proceedings involve many different costs
(lawyers´ fees, experts’ expenses, travels, translations, etc), including the court fees
payable in some countries. Wary of incurring excessive legal expenses and aware of the deadline
criterion, many claimants decide not to exercise their rights before a court of law, restraining their
access to justice. Therefore, states are responsible to ensure that applicants do not have to bear
disproportionate costs, and that those who can prove their lack of financial resources are not prevented
from seeking redress but are provided with legal aid.
3 Content of Part
III
- Having all these concerns in mind, Part III is dedicated to the
following two topics: access to justice and costs of litigation. If one takes a closer look at the
interplay between the two, it becomes apparent that they are closely interrelated. Access to justice
inevitably leads to transaction costs in connection with the operation of the courts, the taking of
evidence, and the litigation activities of the parties. The state must therefore answer the question of
where the required funds are to come from, who ultimately has to bear the costs, and how to settle cost
issues without provoking unwanted further litigation over litigation costs.
- In principle, it is within the state’s margin of appreciation
to determine what a cost-efficient procedural framework should look like and to what extent the taxpayer
or rather the parties should bear the cost burden. This is acceptable, since, at least theoretically,
access to justice can be guaranteed in very different ways, eg, by an oral hearing before a panel of
judges in the presence of parties and lawyers, but also by a simplified summary online procedure. In
civil and commercial matters, it must also be taken into account that neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant has unlimited financial resources. Thus, not only in the interest of the functioning of its
court system, but also in the interest of the defendant, the state can deliberately charge court fees
and create a certain cost risk in order to discourage plaintiffs from hastily taking legal action or
bringing vexatious lawsuits.
- However, it is to be considered that different groups of parties
have very different degrees of ability, on the one hand, to assert their position in a particular
procedural setting and, on the other hand, to finance litigation that proves necessary. Without the
advice of a lawyer, individuals can hardly assess how promising their position is and whether a judicial
or an extrajudicial dispute resolution is more appropriate. Furthermore, the mere risk of having to bear
all or part of the costs of litigation in the event of defeat, or possibly even regardless of the
outcome of the lawsuit, can deter even a well-advised and justifiably optimistic party from filing or
defending a claim. Consequently, the state’s margin of appreciation has its limit where the cost
efficiency of the procedural regime undermines access to justice. The supposedly more technical rules on
costs and funding must therefore be measured above all by whether they are consistent with the
fundamental right of access to justice: Not only justice delayed, but also justice overpriced is justice denied.
- These few introductory remarks should recall that cost efficiency
is an important factor, but by no means the only one, since it can be in conflict with procedural
justice. Analysing the ways in which this conflict is balanced in the legal systems under study is a
core question of our task. All these issues are addressed in six chapters, grouped in two blocks:
3.1 Access to
justice
- Chapter 2 (‘Access to Justice as a Fundamental
Right’) will address the recognition of this right in different legal systems, examining whether
it is a guarantee of constitutional nature or not, and if it deserves universal or supranational
protection. It covers its definition, essential content, and new current trends in access to justice at
the national and international levels. Chapter 3 (‘Particular Aspects of Access to
Justice’) will analyse in detail the different rights that this essential guarantee encompasses
(in particular, access to an oral hearing, access to appellate courts, and access to legal advice and
representation) and current trends in different countries.
3.2 Costs of
litigation
- The next four chapters are devoted to the costs of litigation and
the ways how different countries address this issue of paramount importance in practice that normally
receives rather less attention from procedural doctrine. Four topics are covered: must cost efficiency
work as a procedural principle, and, if yes, what does this imply (Chapter 4: ‘Cost
Efficiency as a Guiding Principle’)? Who must bear the litigation costs and what are the different
cost allocation options (Chapter 5: ‘Cost Allocation’)? And finally, how can access to
justice be funded, analysing in how far states provide legal aid and services (Chapter 6: ‘Public
Funding’) and how relevant private instruments are in this respect (Chapter 7: ‘Private
Funding’).
Abbreviations and Acronyms
Art
|
Article/Articles
|
CCJE
|
Consultative Council of European Judges
|
CEPEJ
|
Conseil de l'Europe Commission européenne pour
l’efficacité de la justice (Council of Europe European
Commission for the efficiency of justice)
|
cf
|
confer (compare)
|
ch
|
chapter
|
CJEU
|
Court of Justice of the European Union
|
ECLI
|
European Case Law Identifier
|
ECtHR
|
European Court of Human Rights
|
ed
|
editor/editors
|
edn
|
edition/editions
|
eg
|
exempli gratia (for example)
|
etc
|
et cetera
|
EU
|
European Union
|
EUR
|
Euro
|
ff
|
following
|
fn
|
footnote (external, ie, in other chapters or in citations)
|
GBP
|
British Pound
|
ibid
|
ibidem (in the same place)
|
ICT
|
Information and Communication Technologies
|
ie
|
id est (that is)
|
n
|
footnote (internal, ie, within the same chapter)
|
no
|
number/numbers
|
OECD
|
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
|
para
|
paragraph/paragraphs
|
pt
|
part
|
Sec
|
Section/Sections
|
SMEs
|
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
|
supp
|
supplement/supplements
|
trans/tr
|
translated, translation/translator
|
UK
|
United Kingdom
|
US / USA
|
United States of America
|
v
|
versus
|
vol
|
volume/volumes
|
Cases
International/Supranational
Fälie v Romania, Case 232570/04 (ECtHR), Judgment 19
May 2015 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:0519JUD002325704].
Gankin and other v Russia (ECtHR), Judgment 31 May
2016 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0531JUD00024300].
Golder v the United Kingdom (ECtHR), Judgment 21
February 1975 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:1975:0221JUD000445170].
Jakutavicius v Lithuania (ECtHR), Judgment 13 February
2024 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0213JUD004218019].
Bîzdîga v The Republic of Moldova (ECtHR),
Judgment 17 October 2023 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:1017JUD001564618].
Jann-Zwicker and Jann v Switzerland (ECtHR), Judgment
13 February 2024 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0213JUD000497620].
Alasini and others v Telecom
Italia (CJEU), Judgment 18 March 2010, [ECLI:EU:C:2010:146].
Klopstra v Spain (ECtHR), Judgment 19 January 2021
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:2021:0119JUD006561016].
Dilipak and Karakaya v Turkey (ECtHR), Judgment of 19
January 2021. [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:0915JUD002968005].
Hypotecni banka (CJEU), Judgment 17 November 2021
[ECLI:EU:C:2011:745].
Szwagrun-Baurycza v Poland (ECtHR), Judgment 24
October 2006 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:1024JUD004118702].
Willems and Gorjon v Belgium (ECtHR), Judgment 21
September 2021 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2021:0921JUD007420916].
Bibliography
Cappelletti M and Garth B, ‘Access to justice: the newest wave in the movement
to make rights effective’ (1978) 27 Buffalo Law Review 186.
CEPEJ, ‘European Judicial systems CEPEJ Evaluation Report’, Part 1, 2022
Evaluation cycle (2020 data).
Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion n 11 on
the quality of judicial decisions (30 June 2008) https://www.coe.int/en/web/ccje/opinion-n-11-on-the-quality-of-judicial-decisions accessed 21 October 2024.
D Harris, M O’Boyle and C Warbrick, Law of the
European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2014).
FRA Report on Access to Justice also refers to certain EU countries that include
excessive procedural demands in their procedural laws, The European Union Agency
for Fundamental Rights, Access to justice in Europe: an overview of challenges and opportunities (2010) 43 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1520-report-access-to-justice_EN.pdf accessed 21 October 2024.
M Hayes, ‘Access to justice’ (2010) 99(393) An Irish Quarterly Review
29, 29.
OECD, Equal Access to Justice for Inclusive Growth: Putting
People at the Centre (OECD Publishing 2019) 32 https://www.oecd.org/governance/equal-access-to-justice-for-inclusive-growth-597f5b7f-en.htm accessed 21 October 2024.
UN General Assembly, Transforming our world: the 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1, 2015) https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda accessed 21 October 2024.
World Justice Project, Global Insights on Access to
Justice (Washington, D.C.: WJP, 2019) https://worldjusticeproject.org/access-to-justice-data/#/map accessed 21 October 2024.
María Luisa Villamarín López
[1] To give other examples, in Africa:
6.9 out of 10 in Burkina Faso; 7.6 in Angola; 7.4 in Ethiopia; 7.3 in Malawi; or 7.9 in Mali. In South
America, 6.9 in Brazil or 4.6 in Argentina. In Australia, 6.2. In New Zealand, 6.3, see World Justice
Project, Global Insights on Access to Justice (Washington, D.C.: WJP, 2019) https://worldjusticeproject.org/access-to-justice-data/#/map accessed 21 October 2024.
[3] This ‘cycle of decline’
combines health problems, affecting the work (inability/disruption), reducing the income, leading to
inability to pay the rent, eviction, and homelessness.
[6] UN General Assembly, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1, 2015) https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda accessed 21 October 2024.
[7] Hayes explains interestingly the
meaning of this quote: ‘Even in the days when we were young and innocent about these things, you
did not have to be a genius to detect the logical fallacy, the contradiction in terms, the oxymoron, if
you want to go up market. The Ritz was open only to those who had money - and not always then. For those
not properly dressed, or with the right accent, or not knowing how much to tip the maître d' on the way in or the concierge on the way
out, there was still no ready entrée, no particular pleasure when there and a rather poor
prospect of a return visit’. M Hayes, ‘Access to justice’ (2010) 99 (393) An Irish Quarterly Review 29,
29.
[8] Cf D Harris, M O’Boyle and C
Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP 2014) 399.
[9] Fälie v
Romania, Case 232570/04 (ECtHR), Judgment 19 May 2015
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:0519JUD002325704] para 22.
[10] As stated by the European Court
of Human Rights in its initial judgments in Golder v the United
Kingdom, the right to access, ‘by its very nature calls for regulation by
the State, regulation which may vary in time and place according to the needs and resources of the
community and of individuals’, Golder v the United Kingdom (ECtHR), Judgment 21 February 1975 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:1975:0221JUD000445170] para 38.
With the same words, more recently also Jakutavicius v Lithuania, Case 42180/19 (ECtHR), Judgment 13 February 2024 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0213JUD004218019] para
75.
[11]Bîzdîga v The Republic of
Moldova, Case 15646/18 (ECtHR), Judgment 17 October 2023
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:2023:1017JUD001564618] para 40.
[12] Jann-Zwicker and Jann v Switzerland, Case 4976/2020 (ECtHR), Judgment
13 February 2024 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2024:0213JUD000497620].
[13] Alasini
and others v Telecom Italia (CJEU), Judgment 18 March 2010,
[ECLI:EU:C:2010:146].
[14] Bîzdîga v The Republic of Moldova (n 11).
[15] Cf M Capelletti and B Garth,
‘Access to justice: the newest wave in the movement to make rights effective’ (1978) 27
Buffalo Law Review 186.
[16] CEPEJ, ‘European Judicial
systems CEPEJ Evaluation Report’, Part 1, 2022 Evaluation cycle (2020 data), 104.
[17] “European Judicial systems
CEPEJ Evaluation Report”, Part 1, 2022 Evaluation cycle (2020 data), p. 104.
[18] F.E. v
France (ECtHR), 30 October 1998, 38212/97 and De la
Pradelle v France (ECtHR), 16 December 1992, 12964/82. In this sense, in
Gankin and other v. Russia, the ECtHR sustained that:
‘Whenever an oral hearing is to be held, the parties have the right to attend it and to make oral
submissions, choose another way of participating in the proceedings, for example by appointing a
representative, or ask for an adjournment. For the effective exercise of these rights, the parties must
be informed of the date and place of the hearing sufficiently in advance to have adequate time to make
arrangements to attend it, to retain and instruct a representative, or to inform the court of their
decision not to attend’.
[19] Bogonos v
Russia (ECtHR), Decision of 5 February 2004, 68798/01
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:0205DEC006879801].
[20] Sukhorubchenko v Russia (ECtHR), Decision of 10 February 2005,
69315/01 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2004:0115DEC006931501].
[21] Lobo
Machado v Portugal (ECtHR), Judgment of 20 February 1996
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:0220JUD001576489].
[22] Sukhorubchenko v Russia (n 20); Hennings v
Germany (ECtHR), Judgment of 16 December 1992
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:1992:1216JUD001212986]; Milulová v Slovakia
(ECtHR), Judgment of 6 December 2005, 64001/00 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:1206JUD00640010].
In the same sense, more recently, in Klopstra v Spain,
the Court provided that: ‘In the instant case, the Court observes that, once the applicant learned
of the foreclosure proceedings, he and Ms CVK firstly lodged an action for the annulment of proceedings,
which was the only remedy available for challenging the validity of the notification in the proceedings.
The first-instance court dismissed their claim, by stating in very broad terms that the requirements for
annulment had not been met. Then, they lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court, which was
declared inadmissible owing to the lack of special constitutional significance, despite the fact that
the public prosecutor attached to the Constitutional Court had lodged a suplica appeal. It follows that the applicant’s attempts
to obtain a fresh examination of the case did not result in any real opportunity to have a new trial.
The foregoing considerations are sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the requisite steps
were not taken to inform the applicant of the proceedings against him and that he was not given an
opportunity to appear at a new trial, despite the fact that he had not waived his right to be present
(Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey, cited above, § 94)
Judgment of 19 January 2021)’.
[23] Hypotecni
banka (CJEU), Judgment 17 November 2021 [ECLI:EU:C:2011:745].
[25] Very interesting and detailed
information in this regard can be found in the ‘European Judicial systems CEPEJ Evaluation
Report’ (n 16), 99 ff.
[26] For example, in Szwagrun-Baurycza v Poland (ECtHR), Judgment of 24 October 2006
[ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:1024JUD004118702], it considered that a violation of Article 6.1 had occurred
because the applicant has to bear on their shoulders an unfair burden in the course of the proceedings
due to the court’s insistence that the claimant may provide the identities and addresses of those
potentially interested in the outcome of the case. More recently, regarding excessive requisites to
appeal on cassation, Case Willems and Gorjon v.Belgium (ECtHR), Judgment of 21 September 2021, 74029/16 [ECLI:CE:ECHR:2021:0921JUD007420916],
in which the Court affirmed: ‘that court, in penalising them in this way for their procedural
error, had upset the requisite fair balance between, on the one hand, the legitimate concern to ensure
compliance with the formal procedure for lodging an appeal on points of law and, on the other, the right
of access to a court, and had thus been excessively formalistic with regard to the procedural
requirements for the admissibility of such appeals’. The FRA Report on Access to Justice also
refers to certain EU countries that include excessive procedural demands in their procedural laws, The
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Access to justice in Europe:
an overview of challenges and opportunities (2010) 43 https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1520-report-access-to-justice_EN.pdf accessed 21 October 2024.
[27] On efficiency of first instance
courts, European Judicial systems CEPEJ Evaluation Report, 2022, Part 1, 127.
[28] CCJE, Opinion (2012) no 15 of the Consultative Council of European Judges on the specialisation of
judges, 5 to 6 November 2012.